Broadly speaking, these are the issues that frame the context in which the particulars exist.
The following speech by the president affirms that he and I share similar views on civil society.
"The Most Important Title is 'Citizen'": President Obama on the Significance of a Civil Society.
A search
of “civil society” in my blog will return quite a few hits, and I first
mentioned it in an email to CIA case officer Gary Schaefer. I made the
following statement in a fax sent when initiating a complaint with the DOJ
(posted on this blog at: http://kyoto-inside-out.blogspot.jp/2012/04/non-responsive-doj-new-influx-of-cia.html)
Civil
society is a sphere that is protected under the law from government
intervention, and that is the fundamental concept underpinning civil rights, to
my understanding. Japan is a democratic state under constitutional rule of law.
The people in the intelligence networks that I’m calling to account are in
violation of many of the laws of Japan, not to mention the laws of the United
States with respect to harassing Americans residing abroad.
It has
become apparent that the types of covert action that can be authorized to be
conducted in countries outside the USA include precisely the types of
operations aimed at influencing the political processes and disseminating
propaganda and disinformation to influence public opinion and perceptions that
constitute part of my complaint. The point here is that the CIA attempts to use
deception to convince people in other countries to act in a manner that serves
the (perceived) interests of the USA as defined by a given administration.
Disinformation and propaganda is aimed at portraying American policies in a
misleading way to provide American “interests” (i.e., corporations, Wall St., etc.) an
advantage operating overseas. I will examine the current issue of the
Trans-Pacific Partnership and why the article written by Colin Jones pretty
much assured to my mind that he is a CIA officer, not simply an American living
abroad.
First, however,
it needs to be pointed out that when there is a potential for such activities
to adversely impact or actually come into active conflict with the lives and
lawful work of Americans overseas, the authorization of covert action is always
already problematic, and should probably not even be considered to begin with
in many cases. And when someone reports abuses of the rights of Americans overseas,
including their 4th, 5th, and 14th Amendment rights, it is obvious that the covert
operations need to be rethought and re-implemented in a manner that does not
violate the rights of Americans residing in a given overseas area that has been
targeted for covert operations.
TPP
Anyone
that follows American politics to any extent will be aware of the recent
protracted battle of farm subsidies in the USA with the enactment of the Farm
Bill. The vested interests, including big agribusiness and the commodities
markets, are so entrenched that, fight hard though he may, the president was
not able to implement the badly needed reforms, but compromise is the name of
the game. On the other hand, one thing sought by the anti-reform parties was a
substantial reduction in the food stamps program at a time when more Americans
than at any point in history rely on public assistance for food.
Farm
subsidies in the USA have seriously compromised the economic viability of
small-scale farming in places like the Mid-West. The coupling of farming to
subsidies (i.e., being paid not to produce) has also had the collateral effect
of demoralizing the American work ethic, much along the lines of the
prescription o produce automobiles with “built-in obsolescence” demoralized
American ingenuity in the automotive field.
The TPP
basically seeks to open up Japanese markets to American big agribusiness, and
threatens to bring about similar types of damage in Japan as has been wrought
in the USA with the rise of big agribusiness. The UN has recently issued a
report, in fact, pointing to the long-term problems associated with monoculture-focused
big agribusiness.
Commentary:
Other
problems with the (secret negotiations of) the TPP include the attempt to proffer
advantages to finance interests (i.e., “investors”) against the state itself.
Here is a brief critique on Wikipedia: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trans-Pacific_Partnership#Investor.E2.80.93state_arbitration
Mr.
Colin Jones attempts to reverse the negative characterization of the American
finance sector and apply it to the Japanese farmers lobby. One problem with
that, of course, is that he doesn’t address the American agribusiness lobby or
discuss the recent multi-year Farm Bill negotiations. And everyone knows that
the American finance sector (along with their British cohorts) are the largest
white collar crime organizations in the world, after the CIA itself, of course.
It bears
mentioning that the first CIA officer sent against me—Sasha Peterka—was trying
to persuade me to leave Kyoto for a job with Goldman Sachs in Tokyo. At that
point in time, compared to several years earlier when I lived in Tokyo, the
foreigner population had exploded with the finance bubble, before the eventual
collapse of Lehman Brothers, where another CIA officer sent against me—Jamie Roughan—had worked before moving on to Mizuho Finance, etc.
Considering
that Mr. Jones is basically trying to convince the English language reading
public that Japanese agriculture lobby is evil and the American
finance sector is good for the economy (“stupid”), while masking the
dysfunctional situation in the USA with respect to farm subsidies, he can be characterized
as nothing but a propagandist, meaning that he in all likelihood is an officer
in the Central Intelligence Agency that is participating in a covert
disinformation campaign. Even considering the "ugly American" syndrome, an expat would have to be utterly delusional to rail against the government of his host country and not that of his country of origin in a fair and balanced manner under the circumstances. I wonder what the Japanese students and faculty at Doshisha University thought of the unfairly biased column.
Naturally,
as a long-term American resident of Japan, I do not feel that the TPP is in the
interest of my family and Japan. Fortunately, they have a pretty good
Constitution in Japan, guaranteeing me the right to “freedom of speech”. One
would imagine that CIA officers engaged in disinformation are not operating with
tacit approval of the Japanese government under some secret intelligence
agreement, but engaged in a covert disinformation operation.
Those of you that have been following this blog will recall that I've exposed at least one other writer for the Japan Times (staff writer Eric Johnston) as a CIA propagandist. Apparently, my exposing them doesn't have much of a chilling effect (though Mr. Johnston's columns are not objectionable as the one I analyzed and for which he was probably just a ghost writer/frontman), because they continually repopulate the same roles with different people and slightly modified modus operandi. Vigilance is not optional...
Those of you that have been following this blog will recall that I've exposed at least one other writer for the Japan Times (staff writer Eric Johnston) as a CIA propagandist. Apparently, my exposing them doesn't have much of a chilling effect (though Mr. Johnston's columns are not objectionable as the one I analyzed and for which he was probably just a ghost writer/frontman), because they continually repopulate the same roles with different people and slightly modified modus operandi. Vigilance is not optional...
Now, back to civil society and the CIA overseas with respect to the impact on Americans overseas residing in a given theater where covert operations have been authorized. I have found the following which are extremely interesting and pertinent. I don’t have time to comment on these now, so I’m just provide links to two documents and some excerpts from one.
MOU between DOJ and CIA (revised 1995)
MEMORANDUM
OF UNDERSTANDING:
REPORTING
OF INFORMATION CONCERNING FEDERAL CRIMES
IV.
General Considerations: Allegations of Criminal Acts Committed By
Agency
Employees
A. This Agreement requires each employee of
the Agency to report to the
General Counsel or IG facts or
circumstances that reasonably indicate to
the employee that an employee of an
intelligence agency has committed,
is committing, or will commit a violation
of federal criminal law.3
B. Except as exempted in Section III, when
the General Counsel has
received allegations, complaints or
information (hereinafter allegations)
that an employee of the Agency may have
violated, may be violating, or
may violate a federal criminal statue, that
General Counsel should within
a reasonable period of time determine
whether there is a reasonable basis
to believe that a federal crime has been,
is being, or will be committed
and that it is a crime which, under this
memorandum, must be reported.
The General Counsel may, as set forth in
Section V, below, conduct a
preliminary inquiry for this purpose. If a
preliminary inquiry reveals that
there is a reasonable basis for the
allegations, the General Counsel will
follow the reporting procedures set forth
in Section VIII, below. If a
preliminary inquiry reveals that the
allegations are without a reasonable
basis, the General Counsel will make a
record, as appropriate, of that
finding and no reporting under these
procedures is required.
VII. Reportable Offenses by Non-Employees
B. Any
conspiracy or attempt to commit a crime reportable under this
section
shall be reported if the conspiracy or attempt itself meets the
applicable
reporting criteria.
VIII. Procedure For Submitting Special Crimes Reports
A. Where
the Agency determines that a matter must be the subject of a
special
report to the Department of Justice, it may, consistent with
paragraphs
VIII.B and VIII.C, below, make such a report (1) by letter or
other,
similar communication from the General Counsel, or (2) by
electronic
or courier dissemination of information from operational or
analytical
units, provided that in all cases, the subject line and the text of
such
communication or dissemination clearly reflects that it is a report of
possible
criminal activity. The Department of Justice shall maintain a
record
of all special crimes reports received from the Agency.
B. Where
the Agency determines that a matter must be the subject of a
special
report to the Department of Justice; and where the Agency further
determines
that no public disclosure of classified information or
intelligence
sources and methods would result from further investigation
or
prosecution, and the security of ongoing intelligent operations would
not be
jeopardized thereby, the Agency will report the matter to the
federal
investigative agency having jurisdiction over the criminal matter.
A copy
of that report must also be provided to the AAG, or designated
Deputy
AAG, Criminal Division.
C. Where
the Agency determines that further investigation or prosecution of
a matter
that must be specifically reported may result in a public
disclosure
of classified information or intelligence sources or methods or
would
jeopardize the security of ongoing intelligence operations, the
Agency
shall report the matter to the AAG or designated Deputy AAG,
Criminal
Division. A copy of that report must also be provided to the
Assistant
Director, Criminal Investigations or National Security VIII. Procedure For
Submitting Special Crimes Reports
A. Where
the Agency determines that a matter must be the subject of a
special
report to the Department of Justice, it may, consistent with
paragraphs
VIII.B and VIII.C, below, make such a report (1) by letter or
other,
similar communication from the General Counsel, or (2) by
electronic
or courier dissemination of information from operational or
analytical
units, provided that in all cases, the subject line and the text of
such
communication or dissemination clearly reflects that it is a report of
possible
criminal activity. The Department of Justice shall maintain a
record
of all special crimes reports received from the Agency.
B. Where
the Agency determines that a matter must be the subject of a
special
report to the Department of Justice; and where the Agency further
determines
that no public disclosure of classified information or
intelligence
sources and methods would result from further investigation
or
prosecution, and the security of ongoing intelligent operations would
not be
jeopardized thereby, the Agency will report the matter to the
federal
investigative agency having jurisdiction over the criminal matter.
A copy
of that report must also be provided to the AAG, or designated
Deputy
AAG, Criminal Division.
C. Where
the Agency determines that further investigation or prosecution of
a matter
that must be specifically reported may result in a public
disclosure
of classified information or intelligence sources or methods or
would
jeopardize the security of ongoing intelligence operations, the
Agency
shall report the matter to the AAG or designated Deputy AAG,
Criminal
Division. A copy of that report must also be provided to the
Assistant
Director, Criminal Investigations or National Security
Protecting
Classified Information and the Rights of Criminal Defendants:
The
Classified Information Procedures Act
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